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15 February 1961  
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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\*Berlin: The East Germans have in effect formally served notice on Bonn that they do not now intend to fulfill their previous commitment to relax restrictions on West Germans traveling to East Berlin. In a meeting between the East and West German trade representatives on 8 February the East German official read a prepared statement citing West German publication of one aspect of last December's secret agreement as the pretext for not fulfilling the pact. The formal statement and the subsequent action preventing West German church leaders from attending a meeting in East Berlin last week end appear intended as a test by the East Germans of West German firmness; the USSR does not appear interested in creating a crisis over Berlin at this time. East Germans may feel that Bonn would be reluctant to terminate again the interzonal trade agreements. A West German cabinet meeting is scheduled for 15 February to consider the new situation and possible means of retaliation.

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India - Communist China: Nehru's release to the Indian Parliament on 14 February of official reports on the abortive Sino-Indian border talks underscores the deadlock between New Delhi and Peiping. The reports, submitted separately by the Indian and Chinese experts who compared historical evidence of their claims in Peiping, New Delhi, and Rangoon from June to December 1960, point up the sharp differences between the two

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sides and leave little basis for further early efforts toward a solution. The reports also indicate that Peiping refuses to recognize India's special rights in Bhutan and Sikkim under treaties with those Himalayan states. While reiterating his refusal to accept Chinese occupation of Indian territory, Nehru continues to stress a peaceful solution to the dispute. There now seems even less likelihood that Nehru, who will come under increasing domestic pressure to take firmer action against China, will go to Peiping in response to Chou En-lai's invitation last April.

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
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Cuba: Foreign Communist leaders, in Havana during the early January commemoration of the second anniversary of the Cuban revolution, showed particular interest in the modus operandi of the Cuban Communists and in the part they are playing in the regime. Cuban Communist leaders reportedly told [redacted] that the alliance between the Castro regime and the Communists' Popular Socialist party is "exceedingly close" and that the party, with Castro's consent, controls all the "organizations which direct the masses." They maintain that the Cuban revolution will play the same role in Latin America as the Soviet and Chinese Communist revolutions did in Europe and Asia. [redacted]  
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
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### CHINESE COMMUNIST - INDIAN BORDER AREA



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### Sino-Indian Border Dispute Remains Deadlocked

The meeting between Nehru and Chou En-lai in April 1960 in New Delhi was a major attempt to repair the damage to their relations caused by the border incidents of 1959. Although the meeting was almost totally unproductive, the leaders did agree, primarily as a means of buying time and forestalling further incidents, to a series of meetings by Foreign Ministry experts to "compare" and "examine" the documentation upon which each side bases its border claims in the Indo-Tibetan region. The reports which Nehru has laid before Parliament comprise the findings of those experts.

[The major points of difference which emerged from the technical talks were: (1) China's refusal to discuss with India the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan--Himalayan border states over which India exercises protectorate powers--thereby denying India's "special" relationship with these states; and (2) China's reported refusal to discuss the Ladakh area except on the basis of New Delhi's acknowledgment that Indian sovereignty over Kashmir is still in question.]

Peiping will probably counter Indian charges that China's support for its border claims is "weak and sketchy" in contrast to the "wealth" of Indian evidence by alleging that India's claims involve territory taken from China by British "imperialists" at a time when India was under British rule. The Chinese will persist in their attempts to blame the border stalemate on New Delhi. Peiping's propaganda continues to describe the Chinese border accords with Burma and Nepal as evidence that only India's recalcitrance prevents the adoption of a compromise settlement in the Sino-Indian dispute. The Chinese are now said to be interested in opening negotiations with Pakistan for a demarcation of the Sino-Pakistani border--at least in the Hunza area. As part of its pressure tactics, Peiping may also bring increased pressure on Bhutan for bilateral discussion of the border.

Nehru faces an increasingly difficult problem. His efforts over the past year to pave the way for a peaceful solution have proved futile, a fact which critics inside and outside the Congress party will use with increasing vigor as the 1962 elections

approach. Nonetheless, in rejecting any course of action which risks major conflict with China, the Indian leader has no alternative but to pursue his present dual policy of strengthening the country's defense position and maintaining a strong tone in official statements, while exerting maximum diplomatic pressure against Peiping--especially via Moscow.

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Cuban Communists Explain Their Successes to  
Foreign Comrades

Leaders of the Cuban Communists' Popular Socialist party (PSP) appear to derive considerable satisfaction from explaining the successes of their party over the past two years to representatives of foreign Communist parties. They boast that theirs is the first case of the "victory of the workers and peasants" in a country so far from the centers of Communist power and that their victory disproves the "theory of geographical fatalism," i. e., that a Communist regime cannot come to power in a country in close proximity to the United States.

The Cuban Communists' claim that they prepared the way for and provided decisive support to the Castro revolution in its fight for power is not true. The Communists' real road to power came from adroit manipulation of Fidel Castro's revolutionary victory directly and through crypto-Communists and sympathizers. By posing as the "most revolutionary of the revolutionaries," the Communists became, in Castro's eyes, the most dependable defenders of his revolution against the "plots of imperialism" and the counterrevolutionaries. They also proved willing work horses for the regime, which has faced a shortage of skilled personnel in many fields. By causing Castro to react to US and counterrevolutionary "aggressions" by "retaliations" such as the confiscation of most large and medium private enterprises, the Communists have, in effect, taken the basic steps toward "building socialism" in Cuba without doing it in the name of Communism, which would have been politically impossible before now.

The Communists invariably refer to Castro as Cuba's leader and appear careful never to appear to challenge his authority openly. At the same time, their references to Castro clearly imply that they do not regard him as one of themselves.

The Cuban Communists' claim to be in control of all "mass organizations" in the country is substantially true. They also exert considerable control over the regular armed forces and --especially--the militia. These Communist claims, however, ignore the fact that virtually the entire upper and middle classes

as well as significant portions of the lower classes are actively or passively opposed to Castro and the Communists and that many Cubans who once hailed the revolution as a necessary though drastic effort to solve the country's basic political and socio-economic problems now consider Castro a traitor to the original ideals of the revolution.

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